For
over a decade, academics, policymakers, and government officials have
been engaged in a relentless debate about Chinese military capabilities
and intentions. To some, China is likely an expansionist country akin to
Germany before WWI. Others argue that China’s assertive behavior in its
regional offshore island disputes is simply a manifestation of the
Chinese Communist Party’s focus on domestic stability, which precludes
any broader global ambitions.
Mastro photo Contrary to the
extremes of the current debate, the Chinese military will be neither
hollow nor a juggernaut. While the Chinese leadership would prefer to
stay focused on internal development and regional issues, I argue in a
recent article in The National Interest that facts on the ground will
increasingly compel the Party to develop some global operational
capabilities. Specifically, the burgeoning need to protect commercial
assets and Chinese nationals abroad will inevitably shape modernization
of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) toward limited global power
projection, regardless of its current plans or intentions. Even though
the Chinese leadership will embark on this path with very limited goals
in mind, Chinese thinking on how and when to use force could change once
its strategy, doctrine, and capabilities evolve to incorporate these
new roles.
While I posit that commercial, domestic, and
international drivers will push the PLA to have an increasing global
presence, this does not equate to fighting major wars and stationing
troops abroad. If we define global military power by the standard of the
United States, no country qualifies. The question here is not whether
China would have the capacity to invade and occupy far-off countries, as
only the United States can; but whether, like other second-tier powers,
it will develop the capacity to project limited but meaningful force
outside its immediate region.
Chinese Companies Create the Strategic Demand
In
the near future, economic motivations will drive the development of
China’s limited global power projection capabilities. Approximately
20,000 Chinese companies have a presence in more than 180 countries and
regions, creating a constant demand for government protection of these
assets. Furthermore, Chinese overseas investment is growing: at US$60
billion, China’s annual outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) in 2011
was 20 times the 2005 amount.
As Chinese investments
increase, threats to those assets will increase in tandem. This is
particularly the case in politically unstable countries where
nationalization or seizure is always a possibility, or in countries that
have ongoing territorial conflicts where anti-China protests have often
resulted in damage to Chinese-owned property. While still a fledging
phenomenon, there are recent examples of instances that could drive
China to develop limited expeditionary capabilities to augment its
response options.
These incidents are occurring more
frequently and are increasingly threatening to the Party’s strategic and
political interests. Statements made by the Chinese political and
military leadership acknowledge that China’s need for stable access to
natural resources in addition to exploding foreign investment have
expanded its interests beyond the region, while their capabilities lag
behind. Wang Yi in his first speech as China’s foreign minister outlined
trends and principles in foreign policy, highlighting the need to align
China’s foreign policy with its expanding global interests. China’s
2013 Defense White Paper noted that “security risks to China’s overseas
interests are on the increase” and included for the first time a section
on protecting Chinese overseas interests. And in recent months, China’s
president Xi Jinping himself has publicly stressed the critical
importance of a strong military to a successful foreign policy and
dismissed the option of passivity.